Design of a Forgetting Blockchain: A Possible Way to Accomplish GDPR Compatibility by Farshid, Simon et al.
 Design of a forgetting blockchain:  
A possible way to accomplish GDPR compatibility 
 
Simon Farshid 
Frankfurt School of Finance & 
Management 
 s.farshid@fs.de   
Andreas Reitz 
Frankfurt School of Finance & 
Management 
 a.reitz@fs.de  
Peter Roßbach 
Frankfurt School of Finance & 
Management 
 p.rossbach@fs.de  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Practitioners as well as academics expect that 
blockchain technology is a game changer for a variety 
of use cases [1], [2]. This is due to transaction 
immutability enabled by keeping a history of all 
transactions. Nevertheless, this strength can become its 
biggest weakness. There already exists a lively 
discussion on scenarios where it is necessary to delete 
submitted data from the chain after it is no longer 
needed. This becomes even more crucial with the 
introduction of the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). In this paper, we make use of a 
design science research (DSR) approach to design an 
IT artifact in the form of a prototype that maintains 
most of the key features of blockchain technology but 
deletes old data. We evaluate the prototype with the 
help from experts to investigate what to expect from 
blockchains that delete data and derive principles on 
how to design them. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
When we speak of Blockchain, we generally mean 
the technology instead of a specific implementation. 
One key property of this technology is its ability to 
secure old data against modification. This makes 
blockchain an append-only structure, where new data 
can be added but never removed. While this is one its 
biggest strengths, it can also become its most crucial 
weakness. 
For example, when information about users needs 
to be put on a blockchain, strict privacy laws such as 
European General Data Protection Regulation
1
 
(GDPR) and the right of European consumers to 
demand that their data is “forgotten” or deleted, pose a 
challenge for this technology. 
Even when personal information is not directly put 
on the blockchain, historical data can be analyzed to 
                                                 
1 See https://www.eugdpr.org/ for details on GDPR 
reveal identities of pseudonyms. For example, modern 
analysis of Bitcoin transactions has shown that wallets 
can be linked together, compromising the owner’s 
identity [3].  
Consequently, it needs to be recognized that 
anonymization techniques may not stand the test of 
time. To mitigate such risks, the unnecessary 
information needs to be deleted from blockchains as a 
preventive measure. 
While doing this, it is still useful to store 
information such as current account balances and 
recent transactions to prevent double spending attacks. 
However, there is no evidence storing transactions 
ranging multiple years back is a prerequisite for a 
secure blockchain. 
Existing solutions that allow removing transactions 
on a blockchain (like the one provided by Accenture 
[4]) involve giving a trusted party permission to 
arbitrarily edit the blockchain. Such trusted parties are 
only available in specific situations. Since blockchain 
is a general technology, a more general, trust-free 
solution appears to be needed. We therefore state our 
research question:  
 
How can we design a decentralized blockchain that 
forgets, and what implications arise from it? 
 
To answer this question, we follow a design science 
research (DSR) approach [5]. We develop an IT 
artifact in the form of a prototype and evaluate it to 
figure out how to design trust-free deleting 
blockchains.  
This paper starts with a short overview of related 
works and theoretical background of blockchain 
technology, followed by a brief introduction to the 
used DSR approach. We then describe the developed 
artifact and evaluate it. Finally, we discuss its 
implications, give an outlook and investigate 
limitations of our work.  
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2. Related Works  
 
Attempts to protect users’ privacy on blockchain 
are as old as Bitcoin itself, since the Bitcoin network 
employs a few techniques to enable anonymous 
transactions. We identified three types of approaches to 
solve the problem: anonymization techniques, altering 
techniques, and decentralized deletion techniques. 
Anonymization techniques store the identifying 
information of a user outside the blockchain. Bitcoin 
for example, uses anonymous addresses to handle 
transactions, and users are free to create and use as 
many addresses as they want [6].  
Nevertheless, studies have shown that it is possible 
to link multiple Bitcoin addresses of the same person 
together by analyzing their transaction behavior, with 
the success rate increasing as more transactions are 
made [7]. 
To combat this, some anonymization techniques 
not only conceal the identity, but also the actions of 
each user. As an example, Monero [8] was built to 
support untraceable transactions.  
It should be noted that the methods mentioned so 
far store the anonymized information indefinitely on 
the blockchain and are subject to scrutiny for an 
indefinite time [9]. As research progresses and 
computing power increases, systems currently believed 
to be secure may be found vulnerable in the future. As 
an example, the earlier versions of the aforementioned 
Monero algorithm were cracked, retroactively leaking 
identities of old transactions [10]. 
Blockchain altering techniques give access to a 
trusted party to alter or delete transactions. One such 
approach was presented by Accenture in 2016 [4]. 
Using a special mathematical function, it becomes 
possible to retroactively replace the content of old 
blocks. This solution and other methods we inspected 
give access to a trusted party to alter or delete 
transactions. In a situation where such trusted parties 
can be found, this technique can fix privacy issues by 
combining many transactions into one summary 
transaction which lacks historical information. 
Lastly, we look at decentralized deletion 
techniques. Research in this area has focused on the 
scaling issues that blockchains face. Pruning data that 
is no longer required is advantageous when each new 
transaction increases the size of the blockchain. The 
amount of research considering its privacy benefits is 
sparse. As the algorithms share a main goal, namely to 
increase efficiency, they do not always delete 
information in a timely manner. 
Once again, the Bitcoin paper [6] provides one of 
the earliest methods of pruning, with a variation being 
implemented in the software in mid-2015 [11]. 
Unfortunately, Bitcoin’s pruning algorithm keeps 
information about the last transaction of each coin.  
Another Blockchain technology, Ethereum, seems 
more hopeful in this regard. 
In an article, the creator of Ethereum, Vitalik 
Buterin, has described pruning strategies viable for 
Ethereum and suggests a method that removes all old 
blocks [12]. As costs of storing transactions are low, no 
Ethereum-based software has so far implemented the 
suggested algorithm. 
The method described in Buterin’s article is 
particularly relevant for our research question, as it 
leaves no historical information on the disk. Only 
account balances and other necessary information is 
retained in the long term. 
A final point to make is that the pruning algorithms 
presented are meant to be run by a few nodes in the 
network. Little is known about the side effects of 
running networks where every single node prunes 
information, therefore globally deleting it. 
 
3. Theoretical Background  
 
A blockchain is, as its name points out, a 
concatenation of blocks. Its consistency is ensured by 
cryptographic protocols. How this is done in detail is 
up to the specific implementation.  
While the contents of blocks can be set arbitrarily, 
most implementations store transfers of an asset from 
participants (inputs) to other participants (outputs) in a 
transaction. The transaction is only valid if it is signed 
using the private key of the owner of the input. 
Therefore, anyone possessing the public key can verify 
the transaction, but not modify it. A set of those is then 
bundled together in a block. Next to these transactions, 
the block includes a checksum of the previous block, 
creating a chain structure. Now, if the content of the 
previous block is modified, subsequent blocks become 
invalid. Every participant holds a complete copy of all 
the blocks. By iterating through all transactions, it is 
therefore possible to decide if a transaction is allowed 
or not.  
If new transactions are to be added, they are 
grouped together into a new block, for which a 
consensus needs to be found. Most approaches do this 
using the proof of work algorithm. A checksum for the 
new block needs to be calculated. This checksum needs 
to fulfill certain predefined requirements (e.g. starting 
with 5 zeros). To accomplish this, a nonce is added to 
the block. The nodes now compete to find a nonce that 
in combination with the transactions and other block 
data, yields a checksum that fulfills those requirements. 
The winning node (e.g. the first) is granted some 
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reward, mostly in the monetary form of tokens. This 
process is called ‘mining’. 
These blocks are distributed to every participant in 
the network and therefore everyone has the same 
information.  
 
Smart Contracts and the State 
 
Some state-of-the-art blockchains (e.g. Ethereum or 
Hyperledger fabric) provide a powerful additional 
feature: the ability to execute code [13]. This extends 
the blockchain from simply being a distributed 
database to a distributed computer.  
Ethereum, for example, can be defined as a Turing-
complete multi-purpose shared computer named the 
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). The machine is a 
singleton, so there exists only one global instance. 
Using blockchain technology, the state of this machine 
(also referred to as the “state”) is agreed upon. The 
state acts as a persistent storage medium to store all 
account balances, smart contract code (or “EVM code”) 
and internal storage.  
Each smart contract is given its own internal 
storage on the state to store arbitrary information. 
Unlike a traditional computer, the EVM limits what 
parts of the state may be altered. Participants cannot 
spend tokens of an account unless they possess the 
associated private key; once deployed, smart contract 
code can never be updated, and code only has write-
access to its own storage space. 
The state is modified with transactions, which can 
send tokens, upload code or call a smart contract 
function. The result of a transaction execution is an 
updated state. In addition to this updated state, a 
transaction receipt is created. These receipts contain 
log messages and errors during the execution. The state 
itself does not store any historical information [14]. 
Ethereum follows a “state-centric model” [15], 
meaning that the EVM only requires current state data 
to process a transaction. Transaction history is not 
available inside the virtual machine.  
 
 
Figure 1: State transition in Ethereum 
 
Hashes of transactions, receipts, and the state are 
included in block headers which make up the 
blockchain (see Figure 1). The Ethereum blockchain 
uses a proof of work algorithm to generate consensus 
on the order of transactions. Ethereum nodes need, just 
like their Bitcoin pendants, to download the full 
blockchain and verify all transactions. Ethereum nodes 
download and verify all transactions that were 
executed on the Ethereum computer. 
Support for smart contracts in Ethereum has opened 
the door to a wide variety of use cases [16]. These 
provide new opportunities for companies to work 
together and share data. Using blockchain offers data 
integrity, security, fail-safety, and can be a cost-
effective, decentralized alternative to using a service 
provider.  
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
In this paper, we make use of a design science 
research approach (DSR) [5]. In DSR the goal is 
utility, which means that instead of studying an already 
existing IT artifact, it involves the identification of an 
highly relevant problem [17] — the research cycles for 
the creation of a solution and the evaluation of it [18]. 
This artifact can be of various nature, for example a 
construct, model, method, or instantiation [19]. 
As there existed no solution that fulfilled all our 
requirements, we chose a DSR approach.  
We followed the DSR methodology by executing 
the following steps: (1) identify the relevant problem; 
(2) define solution objectives; (3) design and develop 
an innovative IT artifact, (4) demonstrate it; and 
finally, (5) evaluate it. 
 
4.1 Problem identification 
 
We were made aware of the problem that 
immutability of the blockchain technology, and 
therefore the restriction that nothing can be deleted, 
poses an issue for companies that must follow the 
GDPR rules during a conference in 2017. Two 
researchers of the group talked to a practitioner from 
the financial service industry, who explained that the 
fact that companies cannot delete selected or all 
information from blocks, rules out using blockchain for 
a variety of relevant use cases. 
Since the team already experimented with 
Ethereum and discussed possibilities to manipulate 
data in a blockchain, there already existed an initial 
idea to implement that feature. The team therefore 
proposed to create a proof-of-concept prototype of an 
Ethereum-based blockchain. 
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4.2 Definition of objectives 
 
The primary objective is to build a working 
prototype to demonstrate that it is possible to delete 
transactions from a blockchain while maintaining 
functionality. Since this involves tinkering with some 
of the fundamental concepts, we define requirements 
that the prototype needs to fulfill: (1) it needs to be 
tamper-resistant; and (2) all information needs to be 
distributed to all nodes in the network. (3) It should be 
possible for new nodes to join the network afterwards; 
(4) all nodes can add transactions. In addition, the 
prototype (5) must be decentralized and may not rely 
on trustees and finally (6) we delete every transaction 
after a predefined amount of time. 
 
4.3 Design and development 
 
To resolve the privacy issues mentioned, we first 
develop a new pruning algorithm that locally deletes as 
much information as it can without breaking the 
software. We then build a private Blockchain network 
where every node runs our created pruning algorithm 
to conduct tests and our evaluations. 
We build the prototype based on the Ethereum 
blockchain using the Parity client. Ethereum is one of 
the most common and mature protocols that provides 
smart contracts. Parity was chosen because the source 
code is well-documented, and the members of the team 
were already familiar with it. 
 
Designing a pruning algorithm 
 
To develop our pruning algorithm, we first identify 
which information stored by clients is not relevant for 
the operation of the blockchain. By doing so, we can 
assess which information we can safely remove 
without impairing the blockchain functionality. 
We analyze which features of Ethereum require 
access to historical data and validate our conclusions 
by looking into the behavior of two Ethereum 
implementations: pyethereum [15] and Parity [20].  
 
 Current 
block 
Recent 
blocks 
All 
blocks 
First sync X X X 
Staying in sync X X  
Sending transactions X   
Mining X   
Transaction history X X X 
Table 1. Summary of the dependencies of 
each action 
 
As smart contracts only have access to the state, 
their functionality cannot be impaired if we delete old 
blocks. Similarly, mining only requires the current 
block. 
Sending transactions (and simulating their effects 
locally to see the consequences) only requires the 
current block (and its state) as well. During mining, 
multiple solutions can be found for a block’s successor, 
creating two or more branches in the blockchain (see 
Figure 2). This means that a branch of blocks in the 
chain may be exchanged for a longer branch found. 
Therefore, clients need access to recent blocks to be 
able to stay in sync over extended periods. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Not every block makes it into the 
final chain. Rollbacks are sometimes 
necessary. 
 
At this point we can make storing a list of all 
blocks optional by making two specific assumptions: 
no new nodes are added to the network, and we don’t 
need a transaction history. Special solutions for these 
cases are discussed in the Limitations section. 
With these restrictions in place, we implement a 
feature that deletes blocks after a brief period. This 
follows GDRP's principle to store data for the shortest 
amount necessary. 
Through inspection of the Parity code, we identify 
databases storing portions of each block, such as 
transaction data, receipt data, and state. Each is stored 
separately. Multiple indexes are also created to speed 
up database lookups. 
To delete state data, we make use of an already 
implemented feature in Parity called state pruning. It 
was implemented to allow increased scalability of a 
blockchain, as each new transaction increases the size 
of the blockchain.  
Unlike state pruning, deleting other data is not 
automatically done by the official Parity 
implementation. We add a function that deletes all data 
stored about a block across nine different databases 
(source code available in our GitHub repository2). 
The finished software can connect to Ethereum 
networks and process new transactions while 
                                                 
2 Available at: https://github.com/Yonom/parity-demo 
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automatically deleting old ones locally. We now 
proceed to the second development stage. 
 
Building a network that forgets 
 
So far, our software had no effect on a network 
because it was the only participant to delete 
information. For a network to forget, every participant 
must run our pruning algorithm. 
We test this scenario using 5 hosts. running our 
modified Parity software; and another containing 
Etherchain Light [21], an open-source blockchain 
explorer.  
For testing purposes, we have set the block deletion 
duration to 10 blocks (30 seconds). We deployed our 
Parity client over five hosts and additionally connected 
a block explorer to the first client (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Our network constellation 
. 
 
Each host has a Parity user interface (see Figure 4) 
that allows interaction with the blockchain on behalf of 
that host. 
 
 
Figure 4: Parity client 
 
Additionally, we provide a block explorer showing 
the user a live view of how transactions vanish after a 
specific time is passed. 
4.4 Demonstration 
 
We demonstrated the built prototype to experts 
from the financial service industry. These experts were 
one blockchain engineer and two senior consultants. 
Since all our experts had a background in finance, our 
use case for the prototype were financial transactions. 
For every participant, we conducted a separate session 
to introduce the setup, the prototype, and finally, to get 
their feedback. 
We first introduced the experts to the five hosts that 
built the foundation of our blockchain. We then gave a 
quick introduction to the user interfaces, the block 
explorer and an overview of the basic features (transfer 
ether; upload, execute, and delete smart contracts). We 
then asked the experts to transfer a few Ether across 
accounts. The experts could follow the effect using the 
block explorer, especially the format of the transaction 
and the resulting changes to the state.  
After 30 seconds, the expert witnessed live using 
the block explorer how the “pruning” functionality, 
(which deletes old blocks,) caused the transactions to 
disappear from the block explorer (see Figure 5, for a 
screenshot of the situation before and after). The 
account, however, kept its balance but lost information 
about the token’s origin. Since the experts saw that the 
transaction was verified before accepting it and before 
it got deleted, they were assured that it is legitimate. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: An account with Ether balance and 
deleted transactions 
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We then proceed to the second part of evaluation, 
where we provide the experts with a simple contract 
that they can deploy to the blockchain. 
 
 
Figure 6: Creation of a contract 
 
Figure 6 shows the transaction that creates the 
contract. Figure 7 shows how the transaction is deleted 
but the contract code remains in the state.  
 
 
Figure 7: Contract code still exists, but the 
creation transaction no longer does 
 
A function in the contract allows the user to set the 
text of a variable to their liking (see Figure 8). The 
change of this string is sent in the form of a 
transaction. Like every other transaction, our experts 
observe that it is deleted after 30 seconds, meaning that 
only the most updated text is available.  
 
 
Figure 8: Available smart contract methods 
 
Finally, after some experimentation, the expert calls 
the smart contract’s “destroy” function (see Figure 8). 
This function internally executes an Ethereum feature 
called “self-destruct”, which will remove the contract 
code from the state. 30 seconds after this method is 
called, no trace of the smart contract ever existing, 
including the code itself, remains on the blockchain. 
As a last demonstration, we deactivate two random 
nodes. One of the nodes is restarted before 30 seconds 
elapse and another is restarted after a minute. The node 
that was restarted earlier can synchronize to the 
network without issue. The other node fails to 
synchronize and remains detached from the network. 
Nevertheless, the blockchain continues to function 
regardless of which nodes are deactivated. It 
continuously mines new blocks and deletes old blocks 
without issue.  
 
4.5 Evaluation 
 
Based on the feedback we received from the 
experts and the issues identified, we assessed the 
accomplishment of our original objectives in Section 
4.2. 
 We created a prototype blockchain that can remove 
historical data. Our demonstration shows that mining, 
transactions, and smart contracts still work despite the 
changes made to the software.  
Additionally, since we did not alter the transaction 
verification protocol, we still possess a tamper-proof 
blockchain where only the owners of accounts can 
spend their tokens and the code of smart contracts 
cannot be altered or deactivated by third parties.  
We remain decentralized, and no part of the 
network relies on a specific node. All nodes are 
configured the same way and we can turn off hosts at 
will. 
Unfortunately, we hit a few limitations to our 
approach, such as the fact that adding new clients to 
the network is no longer straightforward.  
We also compare our new method to other 
available approaches for implementing privacy on the 
blockchain based on two criteria: being decentralized 
and being immune to retroactive attacks (see Table 2). 
We considered a solution decentralized if there were 
no central actors with special powers. Therefore, both 
anonymization and block deletion techniques are 
decentralized. We could not find any decentralized 
chain editing techniques. 
Immunity to retroactive attacks prevents old 
identities being revealed if today’s algorithms are 
cracked tomorrow. When sensitive information is kept 
indefinitely, as is usually the case with anonymization 
techniques, this property is not given. Both chain 
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editing and block deletion can permanently remove old 
information from blocks therefore, they are immune to 
retroactive attacks. 
 
 Decentralized Immune to 
retroactive attacks 
Anonymization X  
Chain editing  X 
Block deletion X X 
Table 2: Solutions to Blockchain privacy 
problems 
 
We conducted evaluation sessions with experts 
from the financial service industry. None of the 
participants, who were all familiar with blockchain, 
expected a working result that could at least partially 
solve the problem. At the end of the session, all experts 
agreed individually that a GDPR-compliant financial 
transaction is possible with the prototype. 
 However, we received several questions which we 
included here. 
‘How can the blockchain be secure if we cannot 
verify history?’.  
The blockchain is secure because we verify every 
change to the state. This verification cannot be 
repeated after we delete the transactions, but we can 
assume that our client verified older transactions.  
‘If the blocks are distributed to every participant, 
how can I prevent anyone from taking backups?’.  
Although we delete the blocks from the chain by 
default, the technique does not allow us to prevent 
participants from taking backups. Still, this is an 
advantage as the standard behavior is to delete and not 
to keep data. Another note was that not all data is 
meant to be deleted:  
‘What if I want to store data longer than a few 
seconds?’.  
Data in transactions is not available to smart contracts 
and transactions only stay around for a few days. 
Transactions are therefore not a suitable place to store 
information. We recommend storing the data in the 
state using smart contract logic. 
‘In case someone new joins the chain, who should 
they trust, if there are multiple nodes, as there is no 
history?’ 
Since we delete all history, the first block (called the 
“genesis” block) does not exist anymore and therefore 
cannot be used as an initial syncing point. A node 
therefore must ask multiple other nodes for a block in 
the middle of the chain and check if they all recognize 
this block.  
 
5. Limitations  
 
During our evaluation, we were able to identify 
several limitations. First, it seems impractical to run 
our network in a public setting. Our approach cannot 
enforce a network-wide deletion of old data, since it 
cannot control that participants keep backups. Having 
some participants make backups defeats the purpose of 
our blockchain and thus we believe that for now, it can 
only be used inside restricted environments where 
additional financial and legal incentives are established 
to prevent archiving (e.g. through auditing). 
Nevertheless, we recognize a need for future research 
in this area. 
Second, one loses the built-in history of all actions 
performed on smart contracts, as old blocks and their 
transactions are removed from history. Smart contract 
code is still unalterable in our prototype and one could 
log all important information to the state, which is 
persistent. The logging is no longer mandatory and 
must be explicitly implemented in smart contracts that 
require history.  
The third shortcoming lies in the process of adding 
new nodes. Since the information required to derive the 
current state from old transactions is no longer 
available on the network, the original “genesis” block 
cannot be used as an initial syncing point. Some other 
recent block must instead be taken as the starting point. 
This process is currently technical and tedious, and we 
believe it should be improved through software 
updates.  
The choice of the correct initial block is subjective 
and requires trust. Previous work [22] on “weak 
subjectivity” shows that this process is less secure than 
using a well-known genesis block, and one must take 
great caution and ask multiple sources when looking 
for an initial block to trust. Thankfully, the process 
must only be executed once during the initial setup of 
the node.  
Lastly, a node which is turned off for an extended 
period will fail to sync to the network as the blocks 
lying between its last block and current newest block 
may already be deleted. In this case, one must execute 
the tedious setup process again. For this reason, we 
recommend setting the deletion time to a reasonably 
long amount to account for possible system downtimes 
(e.g. seven days). 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this paper, we gave insights through the design 
science research approach that we used to develop and 
evaluate a novel IT artifact for the financial services 
industry. We accomplished this by first identifying a 
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highly relevant problem. After evaluating the existing 
approaches and literature, we proposed a possible 
solution and defined the objectives that we wanted to 
reach with the prototype and the evaluation criteria. 
We provided an IT artifact in the form of a working 
proof-of-concept prototype of a blockchain that deletes 
predefined data after a predefined amount of time. The 
prototype was developed in an iterative manner and 
was evaluated with the help of domain experts. Finally, 
we derived helpful principles for designing data-
protection compliant blockchains.  
Our prototype uses a combination of an already 
implemented technique (state pruning) and a custom 
function to delete logs and other traces, as well as to 
enable the logging of predefined transactions in the 
state of the EVM.  
This approach can be categorized as exaptation, as 
it is extending an at least partially known solution to a 
new problem, which should yield research opportunity 
and knowledge contribution [18]. The evaluation 
points out that our prototype solves the posed problem 
but introduces a set of limitations. 
The limitations we face show us that there is 
potential for future research. We see a need for new 
smart contract best practices when it comes to 
blockchains that forget. Our team plans to investigate 
how smart contracts can be monitored and audited 
when historical information is not available. 
The implications that arose from our results are 
twofold. For practitioners, we managed to identify a 
way that could allow blockchain technology to be used 
in an additional variety of scenarios that couldn’t be 
done before. Additionally, while we have focused on 
the benefits of block deletion for permissioned 
blockchains, the techniques discussed here could be 
used to solve scaling issues on public blockchains, as 
the amount of data grows too big to be feasible to store 
forever. 
Finally, there is a lack of understanding on the 
possibilities that smart contracts offer. Especially when 
it comes to use cases, there is almost no reference 
material on the potential abilities of smart contracts 
and the possible benefits that an extended use could 
bring. 
We hope that advancements in the capabilities of 
technology, like the one presented in this paper, make 
the use of blockchain more practical and speed up 
progress in this field.  
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